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Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

Scott and Janice Chance decided to divide their property into two
lots. Their home was on one lot served by the City of Independence's
("City") water system. Both the City and Public Water Supply District
No. 16 ("District") had water mains next to the second lot. Due to the
poor condition in which the District left their property after installing
a six-inch water line, the Chances decided to seek service for the
second lot from the City. The City refused to serve the second lot
unless they petitioned for detachment from the District. The District
challenged the Circuit Court of Jackson County's order that the
Chances' property, located in that county, be detached from the
District. The main issues were whether detachment from the District
was proper, whether the City could legally supply the water, and
whether the detachment would adversely affect the rest of the District.
The Missouri Court of Appeals held the circuit court did not err in
detaching the Chances' property from the District, because the federal
statute the District relied on did not apply. The District argued a
federal statute protected it from detachment because it was a
participant or party to a $5 million loan from the United States
Department of Agriculture. The court found the loan was a new
project loan that was not made to the District. Therefore, the statute
was not applicable and did not protect the District from detachment of
the Chances' property. In the absence of that protection, Missouri
statutes provide that voters residing in the District's territory may
petition the circuit court for detachment. Therefore, the City's supply
of water to the property was proper under established statutory
interpretation. The court also held the circuit court did not abuse its
discretion in finding the detachment did not to amount to a
significant adverse effect on the remainder of the District.
The District argued it had an exclusive right to supply water to the
Chances' second lot. The court disagreed and found that under
another Missouri statute, cities may supply water to properties inside a
water district's territory. As a result, the District did not have an
exclusive right to supply water.
Finally, the District argued the Chances failed to prove detachment
would not have an adverse effect on the remainder of the District, as
required under relevant Missouri statutes. The court again disagreed,
and decided that one residential water connection does not generate
enough income to amount to a significant adverse effect on the
remainder of the district.
Willow Morrow
Willamette Indus. v. Clean Water Comm'n, 34 S.W.3d 197 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2000) (holding Willamette Industries' petition should be denied,
pending exhaustion of administrative remedies, because the permit's
special conditions did not constitute rulemaking, and, thus, were not
an exception to the Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies Doctrine).
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Willamette Industries ("Willamette") filed a petition for
Declaratory Judgment, Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary
Injunction, and Permanent Injunction against the Missouri Clean
Water Commission ("Commission"), the Commission's chairman, the
Missouri Department of Natural Resources ("MDNR") and MDNR's
director, claiming the new applicable conditions to its storm water
permit were illegal and unauthorized. The Cole County Circuit Court
issued a Temporary Restraining Order, prompting MDNR and the
Commission, among others, to file a motion to dismiss. The motion
alleged Willamette failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. The
circuit court dismissed Willamette's petition without prejudice, due to
Willamette's failure to exhaust the required administrative remedies.
The court concluded Willamette was required to exhaust its
administrative remedies because no exception to the Exhaustion of
Remedies Doctrine covered its petition. Willamette appealed the
dismissal.
The Court of Appeals of Missouri, Western District, affirmed the
circuit court's dismissal of Willamette's petition for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies. However, the court of appeals based its
decision upon a different reason. The court recognized that when
administrative remedies were available, parties must exhaust such
remedies. The court's rationale was that agencies have special
expertise and a more fully developed factual record when parties
pursue agency channels of relief. The court also noted administrative
relief was not required when either the administrative agency lacked
authority to grant the relief sought, the agency's relief was inadequate,
the issue presented was entirely constitutional, or requiring
administrative remedies resulted in either undue prejudice or
irreparable harm.
The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal because Willamette's
petition did not fall under any statutory exception. The court
concluded that all the statutory exceptions to the exhaustion
requirement dealt with were actions attacking the validity of rules.
The court explained that a rule was a statement of policy of general
application and future effect, without regard to specific facts. A rule
was not a determination, decision, or order in a proceeding before an
agency where legal rights, duties, or privileges were determined after a
hearing. Because Willamette's permit was site-specific and of general
application, it did not constitute a rule.
Since Willamette's
conditioned permit was not a rule, the court held none of the
exceptions covered the permit and, thus, the Willamette petition was
subject to the exhaustion of administrative remedies requirements.
Accordingly, the court denied Willamette's petition, pending
Willamette's exhaustion of all administrative remedies.
Kirstin E. McMillan

